New Delhi
Shrewd Diplomacy
By not putting all its eggs in one basket like Pakistan, Indian diplomacy is in a better position to manoeuvre and retain trust of both Moscow and Washington at the same time.
Despite being a beneficiary of Moscow’s unabated support to India’s position in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJ&K) and during the 1971 India-Pakistan war in the UN General Assembly and Security Council, New Delhi preferred to pursue cautious diplomacy by remaining neutral during the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. India’s neutrality on various international issues stems from its age-old policy of non-alignment unlike Pakistan which since 1950s was part of the U.S.-led Western alliances of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In contrast, India pursued a policy of non-alignment.
Neither condemning nor supporting the Russian position over Ukraine reflects the dynamics of Indian diplomacy. It means, both India and Pakistan, despite their existential conflicts are on the same page and tends to pursue a policy of neutrality on Russia-Ukraine war. However, it seems quite unanticipated that India has almost ditched its age-old ally Moscow by not rendering support over Ukraine in the UN Security Council and in General Assembly. India’s neutral stance on Ukraine is also bizarre, despite the fact that on many occasions Kyiv took an unsupportive position to New Delhi over J&K and established strong military ties with Islamabad. Pressure from the West, particularly the United States, may have compelled India not to take pro-Russian policy on Ukraine.
A famous dictum in International Relations that “there are no permanent enemies, and no permanent friends, only permanent interests” very well applies in case of Indian diplomacy which despite its age-old friendship with the then Soviet Union tilted in favour of the United States after the Soviet Union’s breakup. “India’s neutrality on the Ukraine conflict could hurt it in the long run,” says Sudha Ramachandran, a Bangalore-based analyst who focuses on South Asian politics. According to Ramachandran, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 has put India in a particularly difficult spot. Since the conflict between Moscow and the U.S. over Ukraine began escalating late last year, India has avoided taking sides. But with Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, that cautious approach will become increasingly untenable for New Delhi. It could hurt India’s interests in the long-run.”
Explaining that how India’s neutrality on Russia-Ukraine conflict can hurt Indian interests, Sudha argues that, “India’s neutrality in the conflict was made clear again during the UNSC debate on February 22, which followed soon after Putin announced a decree recognizing the independence of separatist regions Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.
In his statement, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations T. S. Tirumurti expressed “deep concern” over the “escalation of tension” along the Russia-Ukraine border but did not condemn Russia’s actions. Indeed, the statement referred only to “these developments” and made no mention of Russia’s actions”.
As the world’s fifth largest economy and the prediction that it will be world’s third largest economy by 2028, Indian diplomacy is geared towards avoiding antagonizing major powers, particularly the United States but in that process it cannot neglect Moscow because of historical reasons. It was the then Soviet Union which in the past had vetoed resolutions in the UN Security Council on Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir and also actively supported India during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Knowing that now Russia and China are like allies and both have antagonistic ties with the United States, New Delhi is in a quandary as how to avoid American pressure particularly when it is in QUAD, a loose anti-Chinese alliance comprising Australia, India, Japan and the United States. For that matter Sudha is of the opinion that, “Since 60-70 percent of India’s military hardware is of Russian origin, India is dependent on Russia for equipment and spares, a fact it cannot ignore especially at a time when a military confrontation with China is possible. While this is an important concern for India, New Delhi cannot ignore the fact that Russia’s actions in recent weeks have enormous long-term implications for India’s national security. The crisis in Eastern Europe will benefit China as it is likely to keep the U.S. bogged down in Europe. It will force the U.S. to shift focus from the Indo-Pacific to Europe. A situation that benefits China is not in India’s interest, especially in the context of their increasingly hostile relationship”.
One can gauge three major implications of India’s perceived neutrality on Russia-Ukraine conflict. First, antagonizing Russia by not supporting its invasion over Ukraine would mean in the future Moscow will not take a stand in favour of India on its conflict with Pakistan over J&K. In retrospect, one needs to recall that the Soviet tilt towards India on the issues of J&K and Pakhtoonistan issue during the visit of the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1950s to New Delhi, Srinagar and Kabul was replaced with a policy of neutrality during the 1965 India-Pakistan war leading to the Soviet mediation during Tashkent Conference of January 1966. When Pakistan acted as a bridge state between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China by arranging a secret visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger to Peking, the then U.S national security adviser to President Richard Nixon in July 1971, the Soviet reaction was hostile, which led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971.
With such deep-rooted ties between Moscow and New Delhi, India’s perceived neutral position will be counterproductive and strengthen Sino-Russian alliance. In July 2023, India will host conference of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in New Delhi that can be an opportunity on the part of Moscow and Beijing to pursue India’s support its policy over Ukraine. It is yet to be seen how Indian diplomacy will deal with simultaneous American and Russian pressure over India on the Ukrainian issue and retains its neutral position. Here Sudha is of the opinion that “Besides, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its declaration of independence of separatist regions in Ukraine and then following that up with an invasion, set a bad precedent, which could have implications for India. It could encourage other countries, like China and Pakistan, for example, to pursue a similar route to occupy territories they covet. This was a strategy that the U.S. used to carve Kosovo out of Serbia in 1999.” It is the fear of breakup of Ukraine patronized by Russia, which can cause alarm and apprehension in New Delhi that India can also face a similar situation backed by a neighbour or a foreign power.
Second, India’s neutral stance on Russia-Ukraine conflict will augment credibility of its foreign policy. That India doesn’t come under any pressure and its foreign policy is above coercion and external pressures will be vindicated. Certainly, India like many other countries, also suffered because of war in Ukraine and the disruption of supply chain of food and fuel. New Delhi has not come under pressure from the West that in view of sanctions imposed on Moscow it should not buy oil from Russia. Credibility of Indian foreign policy is the utmost reality amidst signs of opportunism when New Delhi after the Soviet disintegration and the end of cold war decided to enhance level of its engagement with the United States, which was manifested in 2005 India-U.S civil nuclear deal.
By not putting all of its eggs in one basket like Pakistan, Indian diplomacy is in a better position to manoeuvre and retain trust of both Moscow and Washington at the same time. By practicing shrewd diplomacy to deal with the implications of Russia-Ukraine war, Indian Foreign Minister Jay Shankar is able to distance from the hard position of Moscow and Washington as far as Ukrainian conflict is concerned. Finally, Indian neutrality on Russian-Ukrainian conflict is like walking a tightrope as a slight tilt in favour of either Moscow or Washington can seriously dub New Delhi as a partisan state. Already, India has taken a different position than the U.S when it decided to buy oil from Russia. At the same time, India by not condemning Russian attack over Ukraine has tried to balance its position.
The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations and former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi. He can be reached at moonis.ahmar59@gmail.com
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Very deep analysis penned down very well. An excellent article with historical facts. Prof. Ahmar’s vision is extraordinary.