Colombo
Debt Trap
Despite the gossip, Sri Lanka and China seem to have a long future together.
With Sri Lanka standing at the cusp of impending socio-economic doom, the Rajapaksa family that once ran everything in the country, now seems to have run out of money. With a country that has lost its foreign exchange, the Rajapaksa brothers now walk a diplomatic tightrope with China. From a neo-realistic perspective, the ensuing protests against President Gotabaya’s regime and the diplomatic tilt towards India’s orbit, has left many to speculate over Chinese ties with Colombo. For many, these developments seem to be the epicentre that might eventually leave a deep fault-line between Beijing's and Colombo’s diplomatic relations.
Sri Lanka has maintained close ties with Beijing ever since the end of the civil conflict between the Sinhalese Buddhist majority and Tamil separatists, back in 2009. It was during this time when Colombo required a very strong ally on the international front but countries like United States, India and other Western Powers did not want to partner with Sri Lanka amid human right allegations against them. The Sri Lankan leadership therefore tilted towards China and then began a decade which saw Chinese money rushing in the country as infrastructure development started to soar. Even though China has been Sri Lanka’s biggest source of foreign direct investment, when Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power, his manifesto included forging ties with India and reiterating an “India First” policy. Therefore, in retrospect, one can reasonably infer that the most paramount reason for the supposed divide between China and Sri Lanka, could be Colombo’s sudden closeness to India. By viewing the external relations of Sri Lanka through the prism of Chinese diplomacy, one can easily see a sporadic phase shift in the external affairs of President Gotabaya’s regime, one that is riddled with a confused rhetoric of trying to balance the weight between Beijing and New Delhi. This has certainly been a very daunting task and one that seems to be tilted in favour of India and President Modi. Consequently, it was also President Modi who became Sri Lanka’s first state guest, after the Rajapaksa family gathered the reins of the government again.
Additionally, when juxtaposed, relations with China have also started to sour as compared to those with India. This can be seen from the time when constant Indian pressure on the Sri Lankan government culminated in China withdrawing from very integral hybrid energy projects in the north of Sri Lanka. Indian rivalry to Chinese presence in South Asia is also evident from the Indian external affairs minister’s statement, who at the Munich Security Conference in February of this year, hinted at the Chinese intervention in Sri Lanka, stating that they can see countries in their region, “being saddled with debts”. This undoubtedly seems to be a direct jab at China and a reiteration of the Indian narrative of the ‘Chinese debt trap’. Another incident of a fallout with China can also be seen from the conundrum over a shipment of inorganic fertilizer which eventually led to the blacklisting of the Sri Lankan bank.
On the surface, it might seem as if the Chinese might forsake the Sri Lankan government but China, on the contrary, is trying to shockproof its relations with Colombo and create opportunities to reach out to Sri Lanka, even irrespective of the normal diplomatic channels. This is evident from the celebrations last February, for the 70th anniversary of the Sino-Sri Lankan Rubber-Rice Pact and the 65th anniversary of Colombo’s formal diplomatic ties with Beijing.
The most integral development in all of this is the fact that this celebration was held by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). This is very intriguing as the CPC seems to engage in its foreign policy with Sri Lanka separate from the state of China. One can even say that the CPC has its own ‘personal’ interests with Sri Lanka. This also clearly shows how Xi Jinping and CPC are trying whatever they can to still keep their footholds within the Sri Lankan governance even if it means to create ways which are not conventional in the realm of international relations.
China was also very quick to respond to the economic crisis in Sri Lanka when it donated supplies among different Sri Lankan parties. China also has denied India’s un-nuanced allegation of the “Chinese debt trap”, stating that this has been a creation of the West. Additionally, the Chinese outstanding debt to Sri Lanka only amounts to 4.5 billion dollars, which is quite less than the total debt accumulated over the nation. Hence, the sophistication behind the Chinese language and argument while dealing with India on the topic of Sri Lanka suggests several Chinese interests that overlap with the government of Sri Lanka.
The Chinese ideology of “strongman regime” can also be seen as an important narrative being played in Sri Lanka’s politics – the Rajapaksa family has always been involved in the country’s politics and has held important government positions. The apparent rise of the Rajapaksas and their subsequent domination at the helm of the current Sri Lankan government can be seen as a reflection of the Chinese model of governance. China’s influence over Sri Lanka is therefore undeniable and just because of that it might be too soon to infer that China might abandon Sri Lanka. For now , the only thing ‘Old Boy Goty’ can do is to carefully walk on this diplomatic tightrope for as long as he can.
Salis Malik is a freelance journalist and columnist based in Islamabad. He can be reached on Facebook @salismalik7777
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