Riwaj and Law

After ba’at (swearing allegiance) to the IEA, TTP is bound to obey Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. And once the Ameerul Momineen decrees TTP to cease hostilities from Afghan territory, Noorwali Mehsud (TTP ameer since 2018) would not be able to defy. The TTP’s reported relocation to the mountainous Nangarhar by IEA is seemingly for better regulation.

Despite wanting acceptable/better terms for TTP’s surrender/amnesty, the IEA would also like to get rid of its TTP baggage that has the potential of spoiling its relations with Pakistan — its staunch and rare supporter. And a pragmatic IEA knows the immense value of Pakistan’s good offices, now and in future. The theory that TTP would be used by the IEA as a future leverage against Pakistan is also too far-fetched. If and when talks fail, IEA would be pressured to restrain TTP, that it is capable of doing, without resort to violence.

TTP carries a lot of blood on their hands and touches a raw nerve running through Pakistan’s body politic. Their heinous attack on Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, killing 150 people, including at least 134 kids, is still disturbingly fresh. Their being in bed with the Afghan Intelligence agency (NDS) and their monetary support from the Indian RAW are open secrets, along with their patronage by the CIA. A blanket and unconditional amnesty would rock many a boat.

TTP, is also not a monolith. In December 2007, about 13 groups united under Baitullah Mehsud to form TTP ‘ostensibly’ to fight the US and all those supporting the US (Pakistan), alongside the Afghan Taliban. Its aims and scope, thereafter, kept changing. In a 2020 reorganization, it embraced the Amjad Farouqi Group, a faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Musa Shaheed Karwan Group, besides Mohmand/Bajaur Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Ghazi Brigade (Lal Masjid), Punjabi Taliban and Hizb-ul-Ahrar, etc., all with different motivations.

Similarly, TTP’s different factions do not harbour equal hostility towards Pakistan. Some like the Swat faction (TTS) just want Sharia implemented in Malakand Division while the Wazir and Mehsud factions feel aggrieved that the state of Pakistan violated their khawra-land by launching operations in 2003-2004 and then by not adhering to the Shakai Agreement (2004). The Kurram and Orakzai factions maintain ties and receive ideological guidance from al-Qaeda, with its members forming part of IS (Khurasan) cadre; the Khyber faction is motivated by monetary gains alongside some, who are simple criminals, etc. The TTP foot soldiers are generally inspired by their ‘purported’ Islamist credentials; romanticism and prestige, that state-defiance traditionally brings in the erstwhile FATA; and simple criminality.

Unlike the Afghan Taliban, TTP lacks a central command. Both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have fought each other. On 10 October 2013, heavily armed TTA attacked a TTP base in Kunar Province in Afghanistan.

Pakistani state and military have maintained contacts with TTP factions in different times for understandable reasons, with ‘fighting and talking’ taking place at the same time. The Shakai Accord (2004), Sra-Rogha Accord (2005) and Miram Shah Agreement (2006) are some examples. However, after the APS attack, when nihilist elements dominated the TTP, amnesty/re-integration would be challenging. The following factors have a bearing.

One, no insurgency can succeed without external havens and support. With TTA morphing into IEA, TTP does not have the ‘freedom of terrorism’ it once had. Therefore, the State - from a position of strength - should negotiate hard with no inclination for undue leniency.

Two, as in such cases, the future good conduct of released/reintegrated militants is to be guaranteed by the tribe/quom/family, etc. With FATA dissolved and the FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations) no more operative, respective DCs in the affected districts - settled and tribal - would have to evolve mechanisms (in collaboration with other agencies) to elicit tribal/family and/or other guarantees, for the safe conduct of the reintegrated cadre, ‘after’ they are punished for their crimes in a ‘commensurate’ manner, in accordance with Sharia, riwaj and/or law.

Three, guarantor(s) would themselves deal with those tainted with heinous crimes. It is still possible in the former tribal districts under Sharia and riwaj. For settled districts, the law will have to run its course. The Swat model could be useful.

Four, depletion of the TTP rank and file is important, even if those more complicit (leadership) renege, run away or hide.

Our decision-makers should avoid undue haste, credit-taking, too much bombast, unnecessary concessions and continue their ‘intelligence-based operations’ unabated.