Crossing the Line

The crucial and critical civil-military relations in Pakistan reflect ground realities in the country’s political history from the early 1950s till today. The surge of the military-bureaucracy influence in Pakistan after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and the seizure of civil power in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999, by the army was because of incompetence, lust for power, corruption and nepotism of the so-called political parties and their leaders. The counter narrative challenging the military’s entrenchment in Pakistan’s politics and governance is based on the premise that political parties were never allowed to play their role and were not provided space by those who wanted to control the instruments of power with the barrel of the gun.

The military and security establishment having a soft corner for Nawaz Sharif was shocked when he tried to assert his position on issues which were considered to be the domain of the real wielders of power.

‘Crossing the red line’ is a term which is propagated by those who consider criticizing the military’s role in politics, governance and statecraft as ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘seditious.’ Yet, in the process of dubbing some people as ‘traitors’, a bitter fact is undermined that those who brought in military governments on four occasions, had committed treason but were able to get a clean chit from the Supreme Court and were able to get away. Why only political parties and politicians are vulnerable and insecure when powers that happen to safeguard the frontiers of the country seize the reins of governance?

One can figure out three major realities depicting the phenomenon of ‘crossing the red line.’ First, like some post-colonial states, Pakistan is termed as having a ‘deep state’ where those wielding power tend to deny democracy and political pluralism, a fundamental pillar of statecraft. When a state is heavily influenced by those representing the military establishment, including intelligence agencies, it is projected and described as a ‘deep state.’ Control over media, civil society and over those political parties that have a non-conformist approach, is exercised in a subtle and covert manner and this is a reality that reflects the deep state. If viewed in the context of Pakistan, analysts argue that the proponents of a deep state who represent the high echelons of military, bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and the ruling political elite, are highly opposed to voices of democracy and dissent.

When non-conformist media, NGOs representing civil society and those political parties opposing the role of the deep state, are arrested, abducted or killed, this reflects the power of the deep state. The history of Pakistan is replete with incidents when non-conformist segments of society were targeted. Curbs over media and control over non-conformist groups and parties continue even when there is a civilian government in power - what the PML (N) calls ‘state within a state’. Second, crossing the red line phenomenon was given some legitimacy when an unwritten agreement was reached between Benazir Bhutto on her becoming Prime Minister in December 1988 and the military establishment that she would not enter some ‘no go areas’ in the realm of national security and foreign policy like Afghanistan, India, the United States and the nuclear program. Bowing to the establishment’s pressure and reaching a deal with them to obtain power, reflected the fragility of the politicians, a pattern which continued even after her dismissal by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of corruption and nepotism on August 6, 1990.

The military and security establishment having a soft corner for Nawaz Sharif was shocked when he tried to assert his position on issues which were considered to be the domain of the real wielders of power. Why did Nawaz Sharif challenge his own ‘masters’ and why was he not able to maintain cordial relations with successive chiefs of army staff, starting from his first government (1990-1993) to the last one (2013-18)? Critics argue that it was because of Nawaz Sharif’s nature of not accepting interference from any state institution, including the army and judiciary, which led to his collision with the two pillars of state and his dismissal from power three times. If Nawaz Sharif targeted the current Chief of Army Staff and DG ISI during his speeches in Gujranwala and Quetta, why didn’t he take a stand against the military’s interference while he was in power? Why did he only criticize the military and security establishment now that he is out of power? Critics lament that hypocrisy and opportunism instead of a principled stance has been the path that Nawaz Sharif follows in politics.

Third, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, it is in the province of Punjab, which is a bastion of military, security and bureaucratic establishments, that voices are being raised against non-political forces for meddling in politics. Nawaz Sharif and his PML (N) mainly represent Pakistan’s most populous province. This province now tends to take a position which is anti-establishment because it wants to transform Punjab’s culture of conformism and toeing the line of the military. Now, the conflict in Punjab is between the PML (N), which claims to represent the province and the military which is primarily drawn from the Punjab. The PML (N) knows that the military will not use force against the people of Punjab unlike against the people of Balochistan, Sindh, KPK and East Pakistan. To a large extent, despite its anti-establishment stance, the PML (N) has been able to maintain unity in its rank and file, barring some voices of dissent from a few members of the provincial assembly, who criticized Nawaz Sharif’s targeting the Chief of Army Staff and DG ISI.

Since the PML (N) has crossed the red line, it will be interesting to witness the far-reaching transformation in the politics of Pakistan and Punjab. If Punjab changes its age-old culture of conforming to the dictates of the establishment, ‘real democracy’ may get a chance and flourish in Pakistan in the years to come.