Additionally, America under Trump has become an indecisive, reluctant and irate power with wider disconnects between the Departments of State and Defence, the CIA, Congress and the Capitol Hill. It seemingly wants regional stabilization through controlled chaos; however, whether it controls chaos or chaos controls the US is another discussion. And its commitment to protect its allies also remains inconsistent.
During the recent stand-off between the US and Iran, the US government’s messaging was confused and inconsistent; with Maj. Gen. Suleimani’s killing initially portrayed to avert “imminent threats” to four embassies by Iranian proxies under Maj. Gen Suleimani; changing to retribution for his past actions and finally it being instigated by footage of Iranian-backed siege on the American embassy in Baghdad. When experts and foreign governments cannot figure out US goals, priorities, red lines and possible compromise points and there are mixed signals, it is dangerous because the adversary frames its response upon such messaging. There could be serious chances of miscalculation and ensuing conflict spiralling out of control.
The US also miscalculated its allies’ reaction to the killing. The Israeli response was calibrated. Most nations called for quick de-escalation. Saudi Arabia and the UAE dialled down tensions with Iran. Europe was consistent against escalation. US media and Congress spoke clearly against another unnecessary war, with Congress passing a resolution to rein in President Trump.
In sum, US strategy, if any, backfired with the Iraqi parliament asking for a US withdrawal, the anti-Iran coalition fragmented, pressure lifted off ISIS, Iran encouraged down the nuclear path and US prestige injured for not honouring agreements. A grand strategy that curtails options is bad and when that happens, jittery Iranian air defenders shoot at passenger planes, adding sorrow to the crisis.
Iran, on the other hand, to this day remains under the aura of its imperial greatness of the Achaemenid, Sassanid and Safavid rule despite contemporary geo-strategic weaknesses. The battle between the Arabs and ajam or faaris (Persia) continues to this day. Iran has vied for direct land access to the economically and militarily important, Mediterranean Sea. Maj. Gen. Qasem Suleimani had strategized to attain this goal, hence Iran’s involvement in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq in establishing what is called a “Shia Crescent”.
Iran’s grand strategy, therefore, can be articulated as domination of an area up to the Mediterranean, by championing Shia Islam and exporting Irani influence through hard and soft power, comprising alliances, militant proxies and cultural encroachments. Militant clients have remained the main pillar of Iran’s grand strategy since the revolution. This approach has helped Iran against Western domination besides enabling it to export its religo-political worldview; extending its military reach and power; reducing political costs of its foreign adventures and bolstering its regional allies and proxies.
However, projecting influence beyond its Mediterranean springboard requires neutralizing Israel, defeating Saudi Arabia/ the GCC, nullifying Jordanian opposition, accommodating or challenging Turkey, avoiding infringing upon Russian interests and, most importantly, forcing the US/ Europe to abandon the region. This involves unbearable expense in blood and treasure. Economic compression, after prolonged sanctions, has shrunk the Iranian economy by 3.9 %; it is likely to shrink by another 6 % this year. Oil exports were down by 50% and inflation has soared by 31% in 2018. Food is costlier by up to 60 %. The cumulative effect has been strikes and protests.
Tehran’s war with Iraq that cost more than a million casualties (over 300,000 fatalities) and US $645 billion has shaped Iran’s military thought. Iran responds to regional challenges through an “offensive and defencive strategy”, involving layered defence, manipulation of geography and asymmetric responses involving atypical combination of conventional and revolutionary forces, emphasizing ballistic-missile programs to match its ambition with limited resources. Iran provocatively retaliates against the US allies having economic relationships with Iran to make them feel the pain. It impounded British and Japanese sea vessels, launched attacks in the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and on Saudi oil facilities in 2019.
Demonstrating unwelcome influence, Iran consolidated gains in Iraq by 2011. In Syria, it has successfully reduced the Bashar-Al-Asad regime to a subservient client. In Yemen, Iran has advised the Houthis, provided them with funds, ballistic-missiles technology, UAVs and explosive-laden remote controlled boats, skewing the war against the Saudi coalition. Iran deploys cyber capabilities effectively, providing cyber tools and training to proxies.
Iran avoids direct and extended conflict with superior powers, preferring to use unconventional forces and proxies to avoid higher casualties. Therefore, Iran’s brinkmanship after the killing of Maj. Gen. Suleimani was more bluster and less substance. Otherwise, Iran risks over-extension and long-term sustenance problems. Iran’s force projection is also suspect, given its sectarian colouring and intrusive nature, leading to Iran’s relative isolation. Its brilliant tactics and operational strategy need to flow from a coherent grand strategy, which it lacks. Therefore, the future Middle East would see a conflict pattern involving rocket/ missile attacks, assassinations, escalatory rhetoric and an ultimate moving away from the brink. Iran would avoid open hostilities and preserve its proxies at all costs. The US would continue its dominance and respond in kind and manner. And the Middle East would need another Lawrence of Arabia.
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